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Abstract
We find that equity mispricing impacts the speed at which firms adjust to their target
leverage (TL) and does so in predictable ways depending on whether the firm is over-
or underlevered. For example, firms that are above their TL and should therefore issue eq-
uity (or retire debt) adjust more rapidly toward their target when their equity is overvalued.
However, when a firm is undervalued but needs to reduce leverage, the speed of adjustment
is much slower. Our findings support the role of equity mispricing as an important factor
that alters the cost of making capital structure adjustments.
I. Introduction
The trade-off theory of capital structure states that a firm selects an optimal
target leverage (TL) ratio that trades off the relative costs and benefits of debt.
Empirically, however, it is well documented that firms deviate from their TL ratios
and do not rapidly adjust back to their target if they face costs to do so.1 Over
25 years ago Myers (1984) noted in his Presidential Address to the American
Finance Association (AFA):
If adjustment costs are large, so that some firms take extended excursions
away from their targets, then we ought to give less attention to refining
our static trade-off stories and relatively more to understanding what
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the adjustment costs are, why they are so important, and how rational
managers would respond to them.
We find strong empirical evidence for one such adjustment cost, namely the
temporary deviation of a firm’s share price from its fundamental value and the
resulting impact on the cost of equity. If equity is overvalued in the market,
the firm’s cost of issuing equity is reduced, whereas undervalued equity results
in a higher cost of equity. If the cost of issuing equity is altered in this fashion,
and if the firm exploits or faces these costs, then the rate at which the firm adjusts
toward a target debt ratio will depend on the degree of equity mispricing. While
the previous literature has debated the permanence of the market timing effects of
mispriced equity, our study models equity mispricing as a factor that impacts the
cost of making capital structure adjustments.
We hypothesize that when equity is overvalued in the market (and thus the
overall cost to issue equity is low), the firm will adjust more rapidly toward its
TL when that adjustment can be achieved by issuing equity. Correspondingly,
when the firm’s stock is undervalued and issuing equity is relatively expensive,
adjustments that call for equity issuance will be made more slowly. The corollary
should also exist when the adjustment calls for repurchasing stock. A firm below
its TL should issue debt, repurchase equity, or do both through an exchange offer.
If equity is undervalued, the cost to repurchase equity is lower, and we expect the
firm to move back to its TL more quickly than a firm with overvalued equity in
the same situation.
Table 1 graphically presents our hypotheses. In this table, firms are divided
into 4 quadrants depending on whether they are above or below their TL and
whether they are over- or undervalued. If equity mispricing affects the speed of
adjustment, then the speed in the top left quadrant (overlevered and overvalued)
will be higher than the speed in the top right quadrant (overlevered and under-
valued). Furthermore, the speed in the bottom right quadrant (underlevered and
undervalued) will be higher than the speed in the bottom left quadrant (underlev-
ered and overvalued).
TABLE 1
Predictions of the Impact of Equity Mispricing on the Rate of Adjustment to TL Ratios
Table 1 presents the major hypotheses tested. The column headings indicate whether the firm is overvalued or under-
valued according to the earnings-based valuation model. The row headings indicate whether the firm is overlevered or
underlevered relative to the empirically estimated target leverage (TL). The predicted rate of adjustment to the target is the
hypothesized value of λ from the equation
(1) DRt+1 − DRt = λ [TLt+1 − DRt] + et+1,
where DRt+1 is the debt-to-assets ratio in period t + 1 and TLt+1 is the target debt ratio in period t + 1 obtained using
the Fama and French (2002) and Blundell and Bond (1998) approaches for estimating the target book debt ratio (BDR)
and target market debt ratio (MDR). Please see Section III.C for details. The distance [TLt+1−DRt] is the total amount that
the debt ratio must change to bring the firm back to its target debt ratio.
Equity Overvalued Equity Undervalued
(equity mispricing: increase equity) (equity mispricing: repurchase equity)
Firm overlevered (trade-off theory: Rapid rate of adjustment Slower rate of adjustment
increase equity and/or decrease debt)
Firm underlevered (trade-off theory: Slower rate of adjustment Rapid rate of adjustment
increase debt and/or decrease equity)
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To estimate mispricing, we use the equity value as determined by the residual
income model scaled by the market price. This approach, developed by Rhodes-
Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005), separates mispricing effects from
growth options. We use 2 versions of the residual income model: 1 that uses
forward-looking realized earnings and 1 that uses analyst’s forecasted earnings.
Any mispricing captured by the forward-looking model could be due to asymmet-
ric information between managers and shareholders or irrationality on the part of
shareholders. Mispricing captured by the analyst data model, on the other hand,
suggests only investor irrationality. In our study, the root cause of mispricing is
not important, as long as managers are aware of the mispricing and use it to the
firm’s advantage when making capital structure adjustments.
We find that within the context of a firm having a target capital structure,
equity mispricing costs have a significant impact on the rate at which firms adjust
their capital structure. More specifically, overvalued firms with leverage ratios
above their target adjust back toward their target more rapidly than do underval-
ued firms. The opposite effect is found for firms that are below their target: The
overvalued firms adjust more slowly than do the undervalued firms.
This finding is consistent with managers exploiting equity mispricing to time
the market. When the cost to issue equity is low (because stock is overvalued),
managers exploit this mispricing to the benefit of existing shareholders and more
rapidly return to their TL. Likewise, when the firm’s equity is undervalued, the
firm will adjust more slowly if adjustment calls for equity issuance, as such an
issuance would be value-destroying to existing shareholders.
We check the robustness of our results with several additional tests. In the
1st test, we substitute the ex post data used to estimate the equity mispricing with
analyst earnings forecasts. This change should reduce any potential endogene-
ity in our mispricing measure. Using analyst forecasts significantly reduces the
size of our sample; however, our results are not qualitatively altered. Our 2nd ro-
bustness test examines whether our method is somehow “hard coded” to find a
result in favor of the mispricing effect. To do this, we randomize our valuation
measure and rerun our tests. We find that our results completely disappear, as we
would expect. For our 3rd robustness test, we differentiate between firms with
positive cash flow and negative cash flow as do Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins,
and Smith (2009), who explicitly examine cash flow effects on adjustment speeds.
Consistent with our expectations, firms with negative cash flow that need to raise
capital will adjust to their target rapidly when equity is overvalued and the firm
is overlevered (in effect, a situation where all the financial planets are aligned
in favor of equity issuance). A similar effect is found when firms have a cash
surplus and rapidly repurchase equity when their equity is undervalued. The 4th
robustness test examines the impact of growth options on the valuation effect and
finds that the valuation effect still persists. Finally, we check that our results are
robust to both market debt ratios (MDRs) and book debt ratios (BDRs), differ-
ent methods of estimating TL, the inclusion of zero-debt firms, and subperiod
analysis.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II discusses previous literature and
provides the motivation for our study. Section III presents the data. Section IV
presents the results and robustness tests, and Section V concludes.
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II. Literature Review and Motivation
A. The Rate of Adjustment to TL
The dynamic trade-off theory of capital structure states that firms have an
optimal target capital structure. If the costs of adjustment were 0, the firm would
have no incentive to deviate from this optimal target, and adjustments would be
instantaneous. However, because of market imperfections such as asymmetric in-
formation and financing costs (which in part drive discreet and lumpy security
issuance), firms may temporarily deviate from their optimal TL. While this phe-
nomenon is documented in other empirical studies, the speed at which reversion
to a target occurs remains a topic of debate in the literature.
The standard partial adjustment model measures the rate at which the firm
adjusts its debt ratio to a target capital structure. A typical representation of the
basic model is
DRt+1 − DRt = λ [TLt+1 − DRt] + et+1,(1)
where DRt+1 is the debt-to-assets ratio in period t + 1, and TLt+1 is the target debt
ratio in period t + 1. The distance [TLt+1 − DRt] is the total amount that the debt
ratio must change to bring the firm back to its target debt ratio. We refer to this
quantity as “DISTANCE.” Fama and French (2002) find that firms adjust to target
capital structures quite slowly (7%–18% annually). Later studies by Leary and
Roberts (2005), Alti (2006), Flannery and Rangan (2006), and Lemmon, Roberts,
and Zender (2008) suggest that the rate of adjustment is somewhat faster than that
reported by Fama and French. For example, using an instrumental approach to
estimate TL, Flannery and Rangan report a rate of adjustment of 35.5% per year.
They argue that the lower rate found by Fama and French is due to noise in the
estimation of TL.2
Several studies have examined the rate of adjustment as a function of whether
the firm is above or below the target and whether the firm has a financing deficit or
surplus. For example, Roberts (2001) finds that the rate of reversion depends on
the current position of the firm in relation to its target. He divides the sample into
4 adjustment quartiles and shows that slow-adjusting firms have more long-term
debt in their capital structure. He concludes that the rate of adjustment for over-
levered firms is faster than for underlevered firms, probably due to higher agency
costs. Faulkender et al. (2009) argue that the rate of adjustment is a function of
the adjustment cost associated with moving toward the optimal debt ratio. They
report varying rates of adjustment based on sunk and incremental costs such that
in firm years where adjustment costs are higher, the firm moves more slowly to-
ward its TL. Byoun (2008) finds that most adjustments occur when firms have
above-target debt with a financial surplus or when they have below-target debt
with a financial deficit.
2Huang and Ritter (2009) contend that previous studies fail to adjust for biases in the data caused
by a “short panel.” When they adjust the number of years that a firm is in their data set, they find that
the rate of adjustment also changes.
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B. Equity Market Timing
The market timing theory of capital structure as proposed by Baker and
Wurgler (2002) states that the capital structure of a firm is the cumulative result
of attempts to time the equity market. Baker and Wurgler find that the long-term
debt ratio is directly related to the “external finance weighted-average” market-to-
book ratio, and they conclude that low-leverage firms raised capital when equity
valuations (market-to-book ratios) were high and high-leverage firms raised cap-
ital when equity valuations were low. The results of Baker and Wurgler are sup-
ported by the survey evidence of Graham and Harvey (2001) and by Huang and
Ritter (2009), who, using aggregate measures of market valuation, find evidence
of a long-lasting market timing effect on capital structure. Leary and Roberts
(2005) also find that shocks to equity valuation can persist for varying lengths
of time. Elliott, Koëter-Kant, and Warr (2007), (2008) find that market timing
helps to explain the security issuance decision, as firms with overvalued equity
tend to favor equity issuances over debt issuances. The market timing theory has,
however, drawn criticism from Alti (2006), Flannery and Rangan (2006), and
Butler, Cornaggia, Grullon, and Weston (2011), among others, who question the
longevity and overall economic significance of market timing.
To date, the literature has not directly addressed the effect of mispricing on
the rate of adjustment to the target capital structure. Flannery and Rangan (2006)
include market-to-book ratio as a proxy for market timing and find it is significant.
However, the rate of adjustment is largely unaffected by its inclusion, and they
conclude that the trade-off model still prevails.3 In our study we view market
timing as altering the cost of adjusting to a target, and the presence of market
timing behavior by firms does not preclude the trade-off theory. Instead, we argue
that market timing influences the rate at which firms adjust toward their optimal
capital structure. We further develop our hypothesis in the next section.
C. Hypothesis Development
Rather than view market timing as a stand-alone explanation of capital struc-
ture patterns (Baker and Wurgler (2002)), we model market timing as altering ad-
justment costs within some other capital structure framework, such as the trade-off
theory. In this context, market timing is a secondary effect, and hence it would be
inappropriate, for example, to run a horse race between the market timing theory
and the trade-off theory. By altering the cost of adjustment, market timing may
impact the speed at which the firm moves toward its TL.
We conjecture that the speed of adjustment to TL is a function of the firm’s
equity valuation conditioned on the current leverage position in relation to the tar-
get. When equity mispricing and TL effects are aligned (i.e., both effects suggest
issuance or repurchase of the same security, either debt or equity), we expect the
rate of adjustment to be faster than when the equity mispricing effect is in oppo-
sition to the TL effect. For example, when the firm is overlevered (needs to issue
3In an early study, Jalilvand and Harris (1984) report that firms move back rather quickly to their
previous debt level (56% per year), and that stock valuation seems to impact the speed of adjustment.
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equity or reduce debt) and equity is overvalued, we expect the firm to adjust more
rapidly than when equity is undervalued. Correspondingly, when a firm is under-
levered and equity is undervalued, we would expect the firm to adjust more rapidly
by repurchasing equity (or selling debt). Our hypothesis is presented graphically
in Table 1.
III. Data and Method
A. Sample Selection
Our initial sample is comprised of all firms on Compustat from 1971 to 2008.
We exclude financial firms and utilities (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
codes 4900–4999 and 6900–6999) due to the regulatory environment they oper-
ate in. In addition, we drop non-U.S. firms and firms that have zero book debt.
However, as a robustness check we examine the impact of zero-debt firms in
Section IV.H. Following Faulkender et al. (2009), we winsorize all ratios at the
1st and 99th percentiles to minimize the contamination of our sample by mis-
coded observations and outliers. We augment the data set with data from Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for estimating costs of capital (used in the
valuation model) and Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES) for analyst
earnings forecasts. As in previous studies, we do not require that firms be contin-
uously listed in the data set, but the residual income model imposes a minimum
4-year survival bias in our sample. Because of the data requirements for the resid-
ual income model, we have valuation estimates from 1971 to 2005, resulting in
a total of 46,666 firm-year observations.
B. Measuring Equity Valuation
We measure equity value as the intrinsic value computed using the residual
income model. This model has its origins in the accounting literature (see Ohlson
(1991), (1995)), and has been applied in a number of finance applications. For
example, D’Mello and Shroff (2000) find that undervaluation measured by
the residual income model reliably predicts share repurchase activity. Dong,
Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh (2006) use the model to explain the method that
firms use to pay for acquisitions. Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999)
demonstrate that the model has predictive ability for the returns of the Dow 30
stocks, and they support the findings of Frankel and Lee (1998) and Penman and
Sougiannis (1998), who also find support for the valuation performance of the
residual income model in the cross section of stock returns in domestic and inter-
national markets.
In their study of equity mispricing and mergers, Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005)
decompose book-to-market into 2 components: the ratio of (intrinsic) value to
market price and the ratio of book value to (intrinsic) value. Rhodes-Kropf et al.
interpret the 1st component (value to price (VP)) as a measure of mispricing and
the 2nd component (book to value) as a measure of growth opportunities. They
show that a VP ratio (using the residual income model to estimate value) better
captures mispricing than the book-to-market ratio. Elliott et al. (2007), (2008)
use the model to capture capital structure decisions such as the choice between
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debt and equity (equity is favored when it appears overvalued) and the method of
funding the financing deficit (again, use equity when it is overvalued).
It is worth discussing further why we do not use market-to-book ratio as
a measure of equity mispricing, as market-to-book is frequently employed as a
proxy for equity valuation in earlier papers. In many of these capital structure
studies however, market-to-book actually performs rather poorly as a proxy for
valuation (the notable exception being Baker and Wurgler (2002)). Examples of
these studies include Flannery and Rangan (2006), who find little effect of market-
to-book on adjustment rates, and Hovakimian (2006), who argues that any rela-
tionship between market-to-book and leverage is due to growth opportunities, not
market timing.
Market-to-book ratio is a poor proxy for valuation for at least 2 reasons.
First, it is frequently used as a proxy for other effects such as growth options
and debt overhang problems, and untangling these effects creates its own chal-
lenges. Second, the relationship of market-to-book with other variables is not
stable across different time periods. For example, the premise that high market-
to-book firms underperform low market-to-book firms (La Porta (1996), Frankel
and Lee (1998)) appears to be time dependent, as Kothari and Shanken (1997)
find that market-to-book ratios have some predictive power over the 1926–1991
period, but that power is substantially reduced during the 1946–1991 subperiod.
Lee et al. (1999) find that market-to-book ratios predict only about 0.33% of the
variation in real stock returns, and they conclude that market-to-book is a weak
measure of mispricing.
We now turn our discussion back to the residual income model, which is
our method of estimating the firm’s equity value. The residual income model is
estimated by adding the discounted expected earnings in excess of the expected
return on book value (this is similar to economic value added (EVA)) to the book
value of equity. Equations (2) and (3) are a formal representation of the model:
V0 = B0 +
n∑
t=1




(1 + r)n × r ,(2)
where the terminal value (TV) is calculated as
TV =
(Et − r × Bt−1) + (Et+1 − r × Bt)
2
.(3)
Here, V0 is the value of the firm’s equity at time 0, B0 is the book value at
time 0, r is the cost of equity, and Et are the expected future earnings for year
t at time 0. Time 0 is the beginning of the fiscal year, and n equals 2 years. We
use 2 versions of the residual income model, one that uses realized earnings (per-
fect foresight model) and the other that uses analyst’s forecasted earnings.4 In
both models B0 (book equity) is Compustat item data60. In the perfect foresight
model, Et (income before extraordinary items) is item data18, while in the analyst
forecast model, Et is the appropriate median IBES analyst forecast made as close
4D’Mello and Shroff (2000), Lee et al. (1999), Dong et al. (2006), and Elliott et al. (2007) also
use analyst forecast data as a robustness check.
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to the year end as possible. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages.
The perfect foresight model allows us to use a much larger sample stretching back
to 1971, while the analyst forecast model is only viable from 1976 onward (when
the IBES earnings data become available). Furthermore, the IBES data cover only
a subset of the Compustat universe in a given year, and coverage is thinner in
the early years of the data. The perfect foresight model does suffer from the fact
that it uses information that is unknown at the time of the capital structure deci-
sion, and therefore we are implicitly assuming that managers possess an unbiased
expectation of future earnings. As we are not testing a trading rule, the use of
forward-looking data should not bias our results, however; the analyst forecast
valuation uses only data that are publicly known prior to the capital structure
decision, and thus does not suffer from a look-forward bias. Our method does,
however, suffer the potential for endogeneity, and we will revisit this issue at the
end of this subsection.
The rest of the inputs to the residual income model are estimated using the
approach of Lee et al. (1999). We use Fama and French’s (1997) 3-factor model
(with monthly returns) to calculate the industry cost of equity, r, with the short-
term T-bill as a proxy for the risk-free rate of interest.5 Lee et al. report that both
the short-term T-bill rates and the long-term T-bond rates are useful proxies; how-
ever, estimates of the intrinsic value V0, based on the short-term T-bill, outperform
those based on the long-term T-bond because they have a lower standard devia-
tion and a faster rate of mean reversion. TV is calculated as the average of the last
2 years of the finite series and is restricted to be nonnegative, as a negative TV
implies that the firm would continue to invest in negative net present value (NPV)
projects in perpetuity.
The estimated intrinsic value of the stock E(V0) is compared to the market






where VP0 is the mispricing at time 0, P0 is the market price of the stock at time
0, and V0 is the intrinsic value of the stock at time 0, which is the beginning of
the firm’s fiscal year. VP should equal 1 in the absence of mispricing. In theory,
a VP of less than 1 implies overvaluation, while a VP greater than 1 implies
undervaluation. However, because the model relies on a historic measure of the
equity risk premium, it is quite possible that fair valuation may not result in VP
equal to 1 if the implied risk premium has changed.6 Lee et al. (1999) discuss this
issue and note that we could just pick a risk premium that results in VP equaling 1
on average. An alternative approach is to use the median VP as the watershed for
over- and undervaluation. For our purposes, it is not the degree of misvaluation
5We also use a fixed risk premium approach as in Lee et al. (1999) and a simple 1-factor model.
The results are qualitatively the same. We use the 1-month T-bill rate from Ibbotson and Associates.
We obtain this data series from Ken French’s Web site (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/
ken.french/Data Library/f-f factors.html).
6The equity premium is the 60-month rolling average of the difference between the return on the
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 Index and the long-term T-bond.
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that matters, only whether the stock is over- or undervalued and whether one stock
is misvalued relative to another. Nevertheless, considering that the analyst forecast
valuations are more heavily distributed during the 1990s, a time during which
market valuations were relatively high, we use the median VP as the boundary for
over- and undervaluation rather than the theoretical cutoff of 1.7
Finally, a potential source of endogeneity could exist in our earnings-based
method, but we believe that this endogeneity will actually bias against our find-
ing a significant result.8 This potential endogeneity occurs because in our model,
firm value and leverage could be mechanically related. Consider, for example, a
firm with relatively high future earnings that we have classified as being over-
levered. High earnings will lead to a relatively high valuation estimate from the
residual income model and, as a result, the firm is more likely to be categorized
as undervalued. The high earnings will also lead to higher retained earnings and
a mechanical decline in future leverage. Therefore, if, at time 0, the firm is un-
dervalued and overlevered, we would predict that it would adjust more slowly to
its target (see Table 1 for the predicted speed of adjustment). However, because
of the mechanical reduction in leverage, the firm will actually adjust much more
quickly (counter to our prediction). Similarly, if this firm were categorized as
underlevered, we would predict that the firm would adjust back to its target more
rapidly (since its equity is undervalued, the firm would be more likely to repur-
chase stock). Yet, due to high retained earnings, the firm would tend to become
ever more underlevered, and the rate of adjustment would appear slower. Both
situations are counter to our hypotheses and indeed to our empirical findings.
C. Implementation of the Partial Adjustment Model
We use a 2-stage approach to estimate speeds of adjustment. In the 1st stage,
we estimate TL using 2 different empirical approaches, namely those of Fama
and French (2002) and Blundell and Bond (1998). In the 2nd stage, we use these
TL ratios in ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions bifurcated by the valuation
measure to estimate differential speeds of adjustment (as in equation (1)). We are
largely agnostic about the 1st-stage method for estimating the TL, and our use of
2 different empirical approaches is purely for robustness reasons.
We base our choice of variables for the 1st-stage TL regressions on
Hovakimian et al. (2001) and Hovakimian and Li (2011) and include firm size,
asset tangibility, market-to-book ratio, research and development (R&D) expense,
and median industry leverage. Firm size is the log of Sales (Compustat data12)
adjusted for inflation. R&D expense (data46) is scaled by sales. We also include
a dummy variable for firms that report nonzero R&D. Tangibility is net prop-
erty, plant, and equipment (data8) scaled by total assets. Market-to-book is com-
puted as book debt plus the market value of equity over book assets ([data9 +
data34 + data10 + data199× data25]/data6). We compute both BDRs and MDRs.
While anecdotal evidence suggests that managers pay closer attention to book
7Our results are qualitatively unaffected if we use VP = 1 rather than VP = median VP as the
boundary for over- and undervaluation.
8We thank the referee for making this observation.
598 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
ratios, market ratios have a more theoretical basis when computing optimal costs
of capital. The BDR is computed as (data9 + data34)/data6 and the MDR as (data9
+ data34)/(data9 + data34 + (data199 × data25)). To reduce concerns of endo-
geneity, we estimate adjustment speeds over the year following the estimation of
the VP measure. Similarly, all other variables used in the estimations are lagged
1 period to avoid reverse causality.
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of these variables and the valuation
measures. The average BDR for all firms is about 25%, compared to an MDR of
approximately 31%.9 The average sales (in 1983 dollars) are $1.391 billion. The
mean market-to-book ratio is 1.28. The mean and median VP ratios for the perfect
foresight model are 0.975 and 0.779, respectively. The 1st and 99th percentiles for
the VP ratio are 0.112 and 2.731, respectively. Using analyst forecast earnings to
estimate the VP ratio (analyst VP) shifts the distribution to the left. The mean
and median analyst VPs are 0.789 and 0.640, respectively, while the 1st and 99th
percentiles are 0.059 and 2.288, respectively.
TABLE 2
Sample Summary Statistics
All the variables are computed using data from Compustat. BDR is the book debt ratio: (data9 + data34)/data6. MDR is
the market debt ratio: (data9 + data34)/(data9 + data34 + data199 × data25). Asset Tangibility is the ratio of fixed assets
(property, plant, and equipment) to total assets (data8/data6). Market-to-book ratio: (data9 + data34 + data10 + data199
× data25)/data6. R&D to sales is R&D expense divided by sales: data46/data12. R&D dummy is a dummy variable that
takes the value 1 when the firm reports R&D expense, and 0 otherwise. VP is the value-to-price ratio measured as the
valuation calculated from the residual income valuation model divided by the stock price (see Section III.B for full details).
Analyst VP is the VP ratio measured based on analyst earnings forecasts in the valuation model.
Standard 1st 99th
Variable Mean Median Deviation Percentile Percentile
BDR 0.254 0.238 0.169 0.002 0.711
MDR 0.306 0.260 0.238 0.001 0.883
Sales ($ millions) 1,391.046 104.954 7,031.561 0.206 24,185.240
Asset Tangibility 0.361 0.314 0.233 0.008 0.922
Market-to-book 1.283 0.911 1.413 0.295 6.361
R&D to sales 0.056 0.000 0.370 0.000 0.991
R&D dummy 0.450 0.000 0.498 0.000 1.000
Median industry BDR 0.213 0.219 0.085 0.018 0.409
Median industry MDR 0.298 0.268 0.195 0.012 0.957
VP (n = 46,666) 0.975 0.779 0.708 0.112 2.731
Analyst VP (n = 22,638) 0.789 0.640 0.580 0.059 2.288
As discussed earlier, we use 2 alternative empirical approaches to estimate
TL. The 1st approach, that of Fama and French (2002), uses the Fama and
MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional leverage regressions estimated annually. We es-
timate the TL for both the BDR and the MDR. The predicted values from these
regressions are used as the variable TL in the estimation of equation (1) to obtain
the baseline speed of adjustment as the coefficient estimate on [TLt+1 − DRt], or
DISTANCE.
Table 3 presents the average annual slope coefficient estimates from the
Fama and French (2002) approach. We report time-series standard errors, which
are the standard deviation of the n slope estimates divided by
√
n. These
9Flannery and Rangan (2006) also report MDRs higher than BDRs using this approach to compute
market debt.
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regressions indicate that firms with more intangible assets and greater amounts of
R&D tend to have lower levels of debt. Larger firms tend to have higher MDRs.
These findings are broadly consistent with those of other researchers.10
TABLE 3
Average Coefficients from Annual Leverage Regressions
Table 3 presents the results from annual leverage regressions, where the dependent variable is either the book debt ratio in
year t+1 (BDRt+1) or the market debt ratio in year t+1 (MDRt+1), and the independent variables are log (ln) sales (data12);
fixed assets (property, plant, and equipment) to total assets (data8/data6); market-to-book ratio (data9 + data34 + data10 +
data199 × data25)/data6; R&D dummy, a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the firm reports R&D expense,
and 0 otherwise; R&D to sales, which is R&D expense divided by sales: data46/data12; and industry median debt ratio.
The mean slope coefficient is the average of the slopes for the 34 annual regressions. Time-series standard error is the
time-series standard deviation of the regression coefficient divided by (34)1/2, as in Fama and French (2002). The t-statistics
are reported in parentheses and are the mean slope coefficient divided by the time-series standard error, and ***, **, and *










R&D dummy −0.0283*** −0.0421***
(−10.11) (−12.34)
R&D to sales 0.0309 −0.0908**
(0.83) (−2.22)
Industry median debt ratio 0.4139*** 0.2988***
(15.61) (20.31)
N 46,666 46,666
Average R2 0.138 0.217
The 2nd approach that we use to estimate TL is based on Blundell and Bond
(1998), which employs system generalized method of moments (GMM).11 In this
approach, the basic adjustment model is specified as
DRi,t+1 − DRi,t = λ(βXi,t + Fi − DRi,t) + ei,t+1,(5)
where DR is the debt ratio, X contains the determinants of TL discussed previ-
ously, F contains unobserved firm attributes, and ei,t+1 contains year fixed effects.
Equation (5) is identical to equation (1) except that βX + F are used as the instru-
ments for the unknown TL. Equation (5) can be rearranged to isolate the future
debt ratio, and to provide an explicit estimate of the speed of adjustment, λ:
DRi,t+1 = (λβ)Xi,t + (1− λ)DRi,t + λFi + ei,t+1.(6)
The baseline speed of adjustment, λ, can simply be obtained by subtracting
the coefficient estimate on the lagged dependent variable from 1.
10The notable exception is Korteweg (2010), who uses a different method for estimating the TL.
11The Blundell and Bond (1998) method is used in the literature as a means of tackling dynamic
panel bias (see Flannery and Rangan (2006)). In unpublished work, Flannery and Hankins (2007)
evaluate several dynamic panel estimators and conclude that the Blundell and Bond method is least
prone to dynamic panel bias. Lemmon et al. (2008) and Faulkender et al. (2009) and others employ
the Blundell and Bond approach in their studies of adjustment speeds.
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Using the actual DRi,t, DRi,t+1, and the estimated speed of adjustment (λ),
we can extract the predicted target leverage TLi,t+1 as the predicted value of
equation (7):





(DRi,t+1 − (1− λ)DRi,t) + ei,t+1.(7)
We note that while some authors use the speed of adjustment estimates that
are generated directly by the Blundell and Bond’s (1998) estimation of equa-
tion (6) (i.e., the λ) , we extract the targets from equation (7) and use them in
the 2nd stage of our analysis by estimating equation (1) to obtain the baseline
speed of adjustment as the coefficient estimate on [TLt+1 −DRt], or DISTANCE.
Our 2-stage approach allows us to compare the results generated by the Fama
and French (2002) targets directly with those generated by the Blundell and Bond
targets. Our approach also allows us to bifurcate the data based on the firm’s lever-
age position relative to the target. While it is possible to estimate the Blundell and
Bond targets first, then bifurcate the data and rerun the Blundell and Bond model
on the bifurcated data to estimate a speed of adjustment, such an approach would
gain little econometrically over using OLS in the 2nd stage and would make di-
rect comparisons of adjustment speeds between Blundell and Bond targets and
Fama and French targets more difficult. As a point of comparison however, we
do estimate the baseline adjustment speeds directly from equation (6) for the ini-
tial baseline regressions before we bifurcate the data. We report these results in
Section IV.A when we discuss the baseline adjustment speeds.
Several authors have argued that weaknesses exist in the partial adjustment
framework. Chang and Dasgupta (2009) argue that partial adjustment models
in general may fail to reject the null hypothesis of no speed of adjustment.
Hovakimian and Li (2011) extend the work of Chang and Dasgupta and outline
precautions that users of partial adjustment models should take to avoid spuri-
ous results when analyzing historical data with fixed effects. These include using
only historical fixed effects and, in the case of the single-step approach, using the
GMM method of Blundell and Bond (1998). Our implementations of the Fama
and French (2002) and the Blundell and Bond approaches employ their recom-
mendations. Hovakimian and Li also address the issue of mechanical mean rever-
sion, which we will fully address in Section IV.A.
Graphically, we present the results of the TL estimation in Figure 1. We
find that both the Fama and French (2002) approach as well the Blundell and
Bond (1998) approach produce some target estimates that are outside the 0 to 1
interval. The Blundell and Bond targets tend to be more widely distributed than
the Fama and French targets. The following sections employ these targets in the
2-stage analysis.
IV. Results
A. Estimation of Adjustment Speeds
The 1st column of Table 4 presents the baseline speeds of adjustment (λ in
equation (1)) obtained for the overall sample using targets estimated by the Fama
Warr, Elliott, Koëter-Kant, and Öztekin 601
and French (2002) and the Blundell and Bond (1998) approaches, with both book
and market definitions of leverage. Equation (1) is estimated with year dummy
variables, firm fixed effects, and standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity
and firm-level clustering.
Since TLt+1 −DRt, or DISTANCE, is calculated as the predicted target debt
ratio minus the observed debt ratio, overlevered firms have a negative DISTANCE
FIGURE 1
Target Debt Ratios
Graphs A–D of Figure 1 present target book and market debt ratios estimated using the Blundell and Bond (1998) and
Fama and French (2002) methods. The horizontal axis represents the target debt ratio while the vertical axis represents
the number of observations in each discrete debt ratio bin. The target debt ratio bins are 2% wide. The dashed vertical
lines mark the 0% and 100% debt ratio levels.
Graph A. Blundell and Bond Target Book Debt Ratio
Graph B. Blundell and Bond Target Market Debt Ratio
Graph C. Fama and French Target Book Debt Ratio
(continued on next page)
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FIGURE 1 (continued)
Target Debt Ratios
Graph D. Fama and French Target Market Debt Ratio
TABLE 4
Baseline Speeds of Adjustment and Potential for Mechanical Mean Reversion
Table 4 presents the baseline speed of adjustment estimates (λ) obtained from the regression of the equation
(1) DRt+1 − DRt = λ [TLt+1 − DRt] + et+1,
where DRt+1 is the debt-to-assets ratio in period t+1 and TLt+1 is the target debt ratio in period t+1 obtained using the Fama
and French (2002) and Blundell and Bond (1998) approaches for estimating the target book debt ratio (BDR) and target
market debt ratio (MDR). Please see Section III.C for details. The distance [TLt+1−DRt] is the total amount that the debt
ratio must change to bring the firm back to its target debt ratio. Panel A presents the results with ex post earnings value-
to-price (VP) ratio, whereas Panel B presents the results with analyst forecast earnings VP ratio. The 1st column presents
the full sample results. The 2nd column presents the results for the subset, which includes firms with debt ratios between
0.1 and 0.9. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are corrected for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. Regressions
include unreported year dummy variables and firm fixed effects, and ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
Full Sample 0.1< DR< 0.9
Panel A. Ex Post Earnings VP Ratio
Fama and French MDR 0.3536*** 0.3818***
(51.46) n = 46,666 (46.62) n = 34,696
Fama and French BDR 0.3325*** 0.3319***
(49.92) n = 46,666 (42.03) n = 36,788
Blundell and Bond MDR 0.2925*** 0.31078***
(48.55) n = 46,666 (43.14) n = 34,696
Blundell and Bond BDR 0.2770*** 0.2669***
(44.17) n = 46,666 (36.91) n = 36,788
Panel B. Analyst Forecast Earnings VP Ratio
Fama and French MDR 0.3705*** 0.4138***
(31.91) n = 22,570 (29.29) n = 15,306
Fama and French BDR 0.3426*** 0.3422***
(33.46) n = 22,570 (27.11) n = 17,073
Blundell and Bond MDR 0.2816*** 0.3095***
(31.75) n = 22,570 (27.83) n = 15,306
Blundell and Bond BDR 0.2759*** 0.2619***
(30.31) n = 22,570 (24.99) n = 17,073
and underlevered firms have a positive DISTANCE. If the firm returns to its target
debt ratio in the following year, the value of λ will equal 1. The results pre-
sented in the 1st column of Table 4 appear to be broadly in line with the prior
research, with adjustment speeds being in the 27%–37% range. Recall that Fama
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and French (2002) found adjustment speeds of 7%–18%, and Flannery and Ran-
gan (2006) found speeds of around 35%. As noted earlier, we can also estimate
the Blundell and Bond (1998) adjustment speeds in the 1st stage of the model
from equation (6). For comparison purposes, these are 18.50% for market debt
and 20.06% for book debt.
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), among others (Chen and Zhao (2007),
Chang and Dasgupta (2009), and Hovakimian and Li (2011)), argue that me-
chanical mean reversion can lead to an upward bias in the speeds of adjustment,
preventing the model from rejecting the null hypothesis that the speed of adjust-
ment is 0. These authors suggest that leverage observations greater than 90% and
less than 10% be removed to mitigate this issue, since a leverage change for these
firms is more likely to be to the mean. In the 2nd column of Table 4 we drop
these extreme observations and rerun the tests. Surprisingly, we observe virtually
no change in the estimated speeds of adjustment. In fact, in all but one case, the
speeds without these high- and low-leverage firms are actually higher than for
the full sample. We are therefore reluctant to accept that in our sample the high-
and low-leverage firms are causing an upward bias in the estimates. Furthermore,
dropping these firms comes at a cost: 9,878 and 11,640 observations are lost
because of book leverage and market leverage less than 10%, respectively. The
number of high-leverage (>90%) firms dropped is much smaller (0 and 330 for
book and market leverage, respectively). Recall that prior to using this filter we
have already culled the sample for firms with debt ratios equal to 0, thus we are
not just removing zero-debt firms. Because of the significant number of observa-
tions lost and the lack of evidence of a significant bias, we pursue our main tests
using the full sample.
So far we have estimated a uniform speed of adjustment for the overall sam-
ple. However, the main contribution of this paper is to allow for heterogeneity in
the speed of adjustment toward TL among over- and underlevered and over- and
undervalued firms. That is, we conjecture that the speed of adjustment may vary
across different groupings of firms based on their current status relative to their
target and the misvaluation of their equity. Therefore, we now relax the restriction
of a sample-wide constant speed of adjustment.
Our basic empirical approach for testing adjustment speeds throughout the
rest of the paper is to divide the sample into subsamples based on the variables
of interest (such as whether the firm is over- or underlevered and over- or un-
dervalued). The adjustment speed regression specified in equation (1) is then run
separately on each subsample, incorporating year dummy variables, firm fixed
effects, and robust errors clustered at the firm level.12
This method implicitly assumes that firms can move from one subsample to
another through time (e.g., if an overlevered firm later becomes underlevered).
This mixing of the observations is desirable, as it helps to ensure that our tests
12This method is widely used in related literature. For example, Fama and French (2002) and Flan-
nery and Rangan (2006) run separate regressions on subsamples. Similarly, Faulkender et al. (2009)
estimate adjustment speeds for each subset of their data. Alternatively, rather than estimating separate
regressions, we could estimate equation (1) for the overall sample by interacting dummy variables in-
dicating whether the firm falls into a particular group in a particular year with the adjustment speeds.
Our conclusions are robust to either estimation method.
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are not just capturing unobserved characteristics that are specific to a particular
subsample of firms. A quick look at the data reveals that for the Fama and French
(2002) MDR observations, there are 13,809 quadrant changes out of a total of
46,666 firm years. Thus, on average, 30% of the firms change quadrant in a given
year.
B. Examining the Effect of Valuation on Adjustment Speeds
To examine the effect of valuation on adjustment speeds, we divide the data
into 4 subsamples based upon valuation and leverage (i.e., see Table 1 for ex-
pected adjustment speed differences). Separate adjustment regressions are then
estimated for data in each quadrant subsample using year dummy variables and
firm clustered standard errors. Table 5 gives the coefficients on the DISTANCE
variable (λ) obtained from estimating equation (1) for each quadrant (in this table
we use the perfect foresight model to determine mispricing).
TABLE 5
Speed of Adjustment Regressions Using Ex Post Earnings Value-to-Price Ratio
Table 5 presents the speed of adjustment estimates (λ) obtained from separate regressions of the following equation for
subsamples of firm years based on whether the firm is over- or underlevered and over- or undervalued:
(1) DRt+1 − DRt = λ [TLt+1 − DRt] + et+1,
where DRt+1 is the debt-to-assets ratio in period t + 1 and TLt+1 is the target debt ratio in period t + 1 obtained using
the Fama and French (2002) and Blundell and Bond (1998) approaches for estimating the target book debt ratio (BDR)
and target market debt ratio (MDR). Please see Section III.C for details. The distance [TLt+1−DRt] is the total amount that
the debt ratio must change to bring the firm back to its target debt ratio. The value-to-price (VP) ratio is computed using the
perfect foresight residual income model. Panels A and B report results from the Fama and French targets using the MDR and
BDR, respectively. Panels C and D report results from the Blundell and Bond targets using the MDR and BDR, respectively.
The 1st and 2nd columns present the results for firm years with overvalued and undervalued equity, respectively. The 3rd
column presents the t-statistic (p-value) for the difference between the coefficients in the first 2 columns. The t-statistics (in
parentheses) for the adjustment speeds are corrected for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. Regressions include
unreported year dummy variables and firm fixed effects, and ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
Overvalued Undervalued Difference
(VP< median VP) (VP > median VP) t-Stat (p-value)
Panel A. MDRs Using Fama and French Targets
Overlevered (DISTANCE < 0) 0.5353*** 0.3384*** 6.75***
(20.01) n = 8,551 (21.49) n = 12,724 (<0.001)
Underlevered (DISTANCE > 0) 0.2436*** 0.4042*** −6.09***
(14.01) n = 14,782 (20.69) n = 10,609 (<0.001)
Panel B. BDRs Using Fama and French Targets
Overlevered (DISTANCE < 0) 0.4531*** 0.2992*** 6.11***
(23.89) n = 10,650 (17.93) n = 11,151 (<0.001)
Underlevered (DISTANCE > 0) 0.3801*** 0.4140*** −1.40
(20.84) n = 12,683 (24.76) n = 12,182 (0.172)
Panel C. MDRs Using Blundell and Bond Targets
Overlevered (DISTANCE < 0) 0.3185*** 0.2960*** 1.15
(19.24) n = 8,816 (25.65) n = 13,811 (0.250)
Underlevered (DISTANCE > 0) 0.1668*** 0.2672*** −4.79***
(12.80) n = 14,517 (16.10) n = 9,522 (<0.001)
Panel D. BDRs Using Blundell and Bond Targets
Overlevered (DISTANCE < 0) 0.3512*** 0.2732*** 3.92***
(22.80) n = 11,248 (21.34) n = 12,974 (<0.001)
Underlevered (DISTANCE > 0) 0.2967*** 0.3375*** −1.62
(18.14) n = 12,085 (19.52) n = 10,359 (0.105)
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We first discuss Panels A and B of Table 5, which report results that use
the Fama and French (2002) targets for the MDR and BDR, respectively. The 1st
row of Panel A compares the rate of adjustment between firms with over- and
undervaluation when firms are above their target debt ratio. The 2nd row presents
the same comparison for underlevered firms. The coefficients on DISTANCE are
significant at the 1% level in all cases and lie within the 24%–54% range. These
adjustment speeds seem broadly plausible, given prior research.
For firms that are above their TL, we expect overvalued firms to adjust back
toward their targets more rapidly than undervalued firms.13 Using the Fama and
French (2002) TL and MDRs, we find that the overvalued firms have an adjust-
ment speed of about 54%, while the undervalued firms have a lower adjustment
speed of 34%. The difference between these 2 estimates is highly significant with
a t-statistic of 6.75. The difference in the adjustment speeds is not only statis-
tically significant, but also economically significant. Overvalued firms adjust to
their target in about 1.9 years, while undervalued firms take almost 3 years.14
Likewise, for underlevered firms, we expect those firms whose share price is
above fundamental value to adjust more slowly than those firms whose share price
is below fundamental value. Again, focusing on the market debt results using the
Fama and French (2002) TL, we find that underlevered, overvalued firms adjust
more slowly, at a rate of 24.4% per year, while underlevered, undervalued firms
adjust more rapidly, at 40% per year. This difference is highly significant, with a
t-statistic of –6.09.
Panel B of Table 5 reruns these tests using the BDR (and the Fama and
French (2002) targets) and finds a significantly faster rate of adjustment for over-
valued firms that are above their TL (at the 1% level). For undervalued firms that
are below their TL, the sign is correct, but the difference is insignificant (t=1.40)
using a 2-tailed test.
Panels C and D of Table 5 present the results using the Blundell and Bond
(1998) TL and the MDR and BDR, respectively. All results are qualitatively sim-
ilar to those using the Fama and French (2002) targets. However, for overlev-
ered (as measured by the market debt) firms in Panel C, the difference in the rate
of adjustment between over- and undervalued firms is not significantly different
(although the sign is correct). Table 5, overall, provides strong evidence that
equity mispricing is an important factor in the rate at which firms adjust to a
capital structure target and represents the primary result of our paper. A firm’s
rate of adjustment toward its target is heavily influenced by the degree to which it
is favorable to issue or repurchase equity securities. In other words, when market
conditions are favorable, the firm adjusts much more rapidly.15
13We do not directly compare the quadrants of Table 1 vertically (i.e., holding valuation constant
and comparing by leverage), as our study focuses on the effect of valuation on the financing decision
given a leverage position. In addition, Welch (2004) notes that the use of MDRs will mechanically
result in more rapid adjustment rates for overlevered firms than for underlevered firms.
14The calculations are 1/0.54 and 1/0.34 for overvalued and undervalued firms, respectively.
15In unreported tests, we bifurcate the data based on whether the firm is close to or further away
from the target and rerun the Table 5 tests. We find that the valuation effect strongly persists for firms
that are greater than 10 percentage points from the target but is much weaker for firms that are close
to the target. We suspect that this is because the target is estimated with error, and there is a greater
606 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
C. Subperiod Robustness
To test whether our results are being driven by specific subperiods, we divide
the main perfect foresight sample into 3 subsamples (1971–1982, 1983–1994,
and 1995–2005) and we rerun the Table 5 tests on each subsample. For each
set of targets (Fama and French (2002), Blundell and Bond (1998), MDR, and
BDR), we run a total of 6 regressions: 2 for each subperiod (1 for the overlevered
firms and 1 for the underlevered firms). We find that when we use the Fama and
French MDR targets, our results are robust to every time period. In addition, the
Fama and French BDR targets are robust in 4 of 6 regressions. Consistent with
our earlier results, we see weaker performance of the Blundell and Bond MDR
targets, which perform the worst and are only significant in 2 of the 6 models.
Overall, we conclude that our results are broadly robust to subperiods. We omit
the presentation of these results to conserve space.
D. Valuation Measure Robustness
In Table 6 we examine the robustness of the results by using the analyst
forecast valuation model instead of the perfect foresight model. To ensure con-
sistency between the valuation estimates and the TL estimates, we reestimate
the target debt ratios for the analyst sample. Again we find evidence that firms
appear to adjust more rapidly to their TL when it is more favorable from an eq-
uity valuation standpoint. Five of the 8 differences are significant and have the
same signs as in Table 5. One of the remaining 3 differences (Panel C of Table 6,
overlevered) has the wrong sign but is also insignificant. Overall, the Fama and
French (2002) targets (Panels A and B of Table 6) support the primary findings,
while the Blundell and Bond (1998) targets (Panels C and D of Table 6) are
weaker.
We do not think that the difference in results between Tables 5 and 6 is due
to sample size or time period covered. Although the main data set (Table 5) con-
tains valuation estimates from 1971 to 2005, and the analyst data set contains
valuation estimates from 1976 to 2005, it seems unlikely that a 5-year difference
could explain the difference in the results. Furthermore, even though the sample
size is smaller, 22,570 observations is still large in absolute terms. We conjecture
that the difference could be either due to the efficacy of the analyst model or to
the analyst model firms being somehow different from the perfect foresight firms.
To examine these possibilities in more detail, we rerun the Table 5 perfect fore-
sight model tests on the subsample of analyst firms. We report these results in
Table 7. The sample size becomes smaller (17,805 firms compared to 22,570 in
Table 6) because some firms with analyst coverage are not in the perfect foresight
sample. This could occur if a firm has analyst forecasts for the next 2 years but
merges or is delisted before the time periods of the forecasts are realized. Over-
all, the adjustment speeds and significance levels are similar to those reported
chance that firms that are close to their target are being misclassified as being over- or underlevered.
Although not mutually exclusive, an additional explanation is that those firms that are further from
their target are likely to adjust more quickly as the benefits of adjustment likely exceed the transaction
costs.
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TABLE 6
Speed of Adjustment Regressions Using the Analyst Earnings Forecast
Value-to-Price Ratio
Table 6 presents the speed of adjustment estimates (λ) obtained from separate regressions of the following equation for
subsamples of firm years based on whether the firm is over- or underlevered and over- or undervalued:
(1) DRt+1 − DRt = λ [TLt+1 − DRt] + et+1,
where DRt+1 is the debt-to-assets ratio in period t + 1 and TLt+1 is the target debt ratio in period t + 1 obtained using
the Fama and French (2002) and Blundell and Bond (1998) approaches for estimating the target book debt ratio (BDR)
and target market debt ratio (MDR). Please see Section III.C for details. The distance [TLt+1−DRt] is the total amount
that the debt ratio must change to bring the firm back to its target debt ratio. The value-to-price (VP) ratio is computed
using the analyst earnings forecast residual income model. Panels A and B report results from the Fama and French
targets using the MDR and BDR, respectively. Panels C and D report results from the Blundell and Bond targets using the
MDR and BDR, respectively. The 1st and 2nd columns present the results for firm years with overvalued and undervalued
equity, respectively. The 3rd column presents the t-statistic (p-value) for the difference between the coefficients in the
first 2 columns. The t-statistics (in parentheses) for the adjustment speeds are corrected for heteroskedasticity and firm-
level clustering. Regressions include unreported year dummy variables and firm fixed effects, and ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Overvalued Undervalued Difference
(VP< median VP) (VP > median VP) t-Stat (p-value)
Panel A. MDRs Using Fama and French Targets
Overlevered (DISTANCE < 0) 0.5348*** 0.4482*** 1.82*
(12.91) n = 4,606 (16.59) n = 6,105 (0.070)
Underlevered (DISTANCE > 0) 0.2490*** 0.3842*** −3.36***
(10.53) n = 6,679 (11.27) n = 5,180 (<0.001)
Panel B. BDRs Using Fama and French Targets
Overlevered (DISTANCE < 0) 0.4348*** 0.3658*** 1.80*
(14.72) n = 4,963 (14.72) n = 5,750 (0.072)
Underlevered (DISTANCE > 0) 0.3468*** 0.4154*** −1.86*
(13.41) n = 6,322 (15.88) n = 5,535 (0.063)
Panel C. MDRs Using Blundell and Bond Targets
Overlevered (DISTANCE < 0) 0.3126*** 0.3370*** −0.81
(12.83) n = 4,257 (18.51) n = 6,650 (0.415)
Underlevered (DISTANCE > 0) 0.2085*** 0.3356*** −3.79***
(10.08) n = 7,028 (12.45) n = 4,635 (<0.001)
Panel D. BDRs Using Blundell and Bond Targets
Overlevered (DISTANCE < 0) 0.2956*** 0.2804*** 0.53
(14.11) n = 5,236 (14.54) n = 6,228 (0.594)
Underlevered (DISTANCE > 0) 0.3172*** 0.3180*** −0.03
(14.19) n = 6,049 (13.40) n = 5,057 (0.979)
in Table 6, suggesting that the difference lies in the characteristics of the firms
with analyst coverage compared to those firms in the full sample. It may be that
the analyst coverage firms are less likely to be systematically misvalued because,
by definition, they have analyst coverage. They also are larger. The average full
sample firm size is $1.4 billion, while the average analyst sample firm size is
$2.9 billion.
It is also possible that the analyst model captures only a portion of the mis-
valuation measured by the perfect foresight model. In our framework, misvalua-
tion comes from 2 sources: the manager’s private information about future firm
cash flows that differs from the market’s perception, and the market’s irrationality
regarding the value of the firm’s future cash flows. The perfect foresight model
could capture both sources of misvaluation, whereas the analyst model presum-
ably only captures the latter. Therefore, we might expect the analyst model to be
a weaker predictor of misvaluation.
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TABLE 7
Speed of Adjustment Regressions Using Ex Post Earnings Value-to-Price Ratio
for the Analyst Subset of Firms
Table 7 presents the speed of adjustment estimates (λ) obtained from separate regressions of the following equation for
subsamples of firm years based on whether the firm is over- or underlevered and over- or undervalued:
(1) DRt+1 − DRt = λ [TLt+1 − DRt] + et+1,
where DRt+1 is the debt-to-assets ratio in period t + 1 and TLt+1 is the target debt ratio in period t + 1 obtained using the
Fama and French (2002) and Blundell and Bond (1998) approaches for estimating the target book debt ratio (BDR) and
target market debt ratio (MDR). Please see Section III.C for details. The distance [TLt+1 − DRt] is the total amount that
the debt ratio must change to bring the firm back to its target debt ratio. The value-to-price (VP) ratio is computed using
the perfect foresight model, but the sample is restricted to firms that have analyst forecast data, as in Table 6. Panels
A and B report results from the Fama and French targets using the MDR and BDR, respectively. Panels C and D report
results from the Blundell and Bond targets using the MDR and BDR, respectively. The 1st and 2nd columns present the
results for firm years with overvalued and undervalued equity, respectively. The 3rd column presents the t-statistic (p-value)
for the difference between the coefficients in the first 2 columns. The t-statistics (in parentheses) for the adjustment speeds
are corrected for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. Regressions include unreported year dummy variables and
firm fixed effects, and ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Overvalued Undervalued Difference
(VP< median VP) (VP > median VP) t-Stat (p-value)
Panel A. MDRs Using Fama and French Targets
Overlevered (DISTANCE < 0) 0.5815*** 0.3703*** 3.74***
(13.18) n = 3,605 (11.09) n = 3,208 (<0.001)
Underlevered (DISTANCE > 0) 0.2734*** 0.4056*** −2.89***
(10.59) n = 7,000 (10.78) n = 3,272 (<0.001)
Panel B. BDRs Using Fama and French Targets
Overlevered (DISTANCE < 0) 0.4368*** 0.2793*** 3.37*
(14.09) n = 4,504 (8.35) n = 3,041 (0.072)
Underlevered (DISTANCE > 0) 0.3812*** 0.3953*** −0.3204
(14.37) n = 6,101 (11.10) n = 3,439 (0.749)
Panel C. MDRs Using Blundell and Bond Targets
Overlevered (DISTANCE < 0) 0.3172*** 0.3021*** 0.50
(14.70) n = 4.732 (14.73) n = 4,147 (0.614)
Underlevered (DISTANCE > 0) 0.1849*** 0.2917*** −2.34***
(7.88) n = 5,873 (6.99) n = 2,333 (0.019)
Panel D. BDRs Using Blundell and Bond Targets
Overlevered (DISTANCE < 0) 0.3442*** 0.2721*** 2.25**
(17.12) n = 5,605 (10.78) n = 3,929 (0.024)
Underlevered (DISTANCE > 0) 0.3105*** 0.3446*** −0.76
(11.77) n = 5,000 (9.45) n = 2,551 (0.450)
E. Randomized Data for the Equity Mispricing Dummy Variable
We are, in effect, testing a joint hypothesis that we have correctly estimated
the TL and the mispricing of the equity. Chang and Dasgupta (2009), among
others, have found that target adjustment models are unable to reject alternative
hypotheses. While our tests primarily focus on the differential in adjustment rates
rather than the absolute level, our mispricing result may still be spurious. To this
end, we use a simulation to show that our tests have the power to reject alternative
hypotheses. In the spirit of the tests used by Chang and Dasgupta, we use a simu-
lation that substitutes a randomly generated dummy variable (a coin toss is used to
determine over- or undervaluation) for the actual valuation dummy variable used
in Tables 5 and 6. We replicate this simulation process 500 times and report the
average coefficients, t-statistics, and p-values in Table 8. On average, there is no
significant difference between the speed of adjustment for under- and overvalued
firms in the simulated sample, confirming that our results are not spurious.
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TABLE 8
Speed of Adjustment Regressions Using Randomized Data
for the Equity Mispricing Dummy Variable
Table 8 presents the speed of adjustment estimates (λ) obtained from separate regressions of the following equation for
subsamples of firm years based on whether the firm is over- or underlevered and over- or undervalued:
(1) DRt+1 − DRt = λ [TLt+1 − DRt] + et+1,
where DRt+1 is the debt-to-assets ratio in period t + 1 and TLt+1 is the target debt ratio in period t + 1 obtained using
the Fama and French (2002) and Blundell and Bond (1998) approaches for estimating the target book debt ratio (BDR) and
target market debt ratio (MDR). Please see Section III.C for details. The distance [TLt+1 − DRt] is the total amount that the
debt ratio must change to bring the firm back to its target debt ratio. VP is the value-to-price ratio computed by a coin toss
(50% chance). The regressions are run 500 times, and average coefficients are reported. The overall sample size for each
panel is 46,666 evenly distributed between over- and undervalued firms. The proportions of over- and underlevered firms
are, on average, the same as in Table 5. Panels A and B report results from the Fama and French targets using the MDR and
BDR, respectively. Panels C and D report results from the Blundell and Bond targets using the MDR and BDR, respectively.
The 1st and 2nd columns present the results for firm years with overvalued and undervalued equity, respectively. The 3rd
column presents the t-statistic (p-value) for the difference between the coefficients in the first 2 columns. The t-statistics
(in parentheses) for the adjustment speeds are corrected for heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering and firm fixed
effects. Regressions include unreported year dummy variables, and ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
Overvalued Undervalued Difference
(VP< median VP) (VP > median VP) t-Stat (p-value)
Panel A. MDRs Using Fama and French Targets
Overlevered (DISTANCE < 0) 0.4140 0.4310 −0.80 (0.372)
Underlevered (DISTANCE > 0) 0.3019 0.3116 −0.48 (0.404)
Panel B. BDRs Using Fama and French Targets
Overlevered (DISTANCE < 0) 0.3418 0.3550 −0.74 (0.353)
Underlevered (DISTANCE > 0) 0.3541 0.3637 −0.51 (0.420)
Panel C. MDRs Using Blundell and Bond Targets
Overlevered (DISTANCE < 0) 0.3078 0.3181 −0.73 (0.389)
Underlevered (DISTANCE > 0) 0.2263 0.2347 −0.53 (0.387)
Panel D. BDRs Using Blundell and Bond Targets
Overlevered (DISTANCE < 0) 0.2745 0.2835 −0.67 (0.362)
Underlevered (DISTANCE > 0) 0.2830 0.2889 −0.35 (0.368)
F. Cash Flow, Mispricing, and Adjustment Speeds
Faulkender et al. (2009) find that the level of free cash flow (FCF) impacts
the firm’s adjustment speed. Firms with either very low (negative) or very high
(positive) FCF are more likely to take bolder steps to deal with their cash flow
positions. Conditioned on this evidence, we expect firms that are above their TL,
with negative cash flow, and whose equity is overvalued (these are the top left
quadrant of Table 1) will be most likely to issue equity. In essence, “all the planets
are aligned”; the firm is overlevered and therefore needs to increase equity; cash
flow is negative, so capital must be raised; and equity is overvalued, and the cost
of equity is cheap. We expect this type of firm to adjust rapidly, relative to a firm
that has a similar leverage and cash flow position, whose equity is undervalued.
Likewise, a firm that is underlevered, with positive cash flow, and has under-
valued equity (the bottom right quadrant of Table 1) will adjust toward its target
more rapidly than a similarly situated firm with overvalued equity. Again, for such
a firm, the “planets are aligned,” and thus the firm will move toward its debt target
more rapidly.
We test for these effects by segregating the sample based upon FCF. We
use the Faulkender et al. (2009) method to compute cash flow, where FCF0t+1 =
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[operating income before depreciationt − taxest − capital expenditurest]/book
assetst, and classify low cash flow firms as those in the lower quartile, while
high cash flow firms are those in the upper quartile.16 We repeat the tests using
Faulkender et al.’s FCF1 (deduct interest expense) and FCF2 (deduct dividends)
and using 33% and 66% cutoffs and find qualitatively similar results.
Panel A of Table 9 presents the tests for the Fama and French (2002) market
debt targets. Panels B, C, and D repeat this analysis using the BDR (Fama and
French targets), and the Blundell and Bond (1998) targets (both MDRs and BDRs),
TABLE 9
Test of the Difference between Adjustment Speeds for Low and High Cash Flow Firms
Table 9 presents the speed of adjustment estimates (λ) obtained from separate regressions of the following equation for
subsamples of firm years based on whether the firm is over- or underlevered and over- or undervalued and whether the
firm has high or low cash flow:
(1) DRt+1 − DRt = λ [TLt+1 − DRt] + et+1,
where DRt +1 is the debt-to-assets ratio in period t + 1 and TLt+1 is the target debt ratio in period t + 1 obtained using
the Fama and French (2002) and Blundell and Bond (1998) approaches for estimating the target book debt ratio (BDR)
and target market debt ratio (MDR). Please see Section III.C for details. The distance [TLt+1 − DRt] is the total amount
that the debt ratio must change to bring the firm back to its target debt ratio. The overall sample size is 46,666. Panels
A and B report results from the Fama and French targets using the MDR and BDR, respectively. Panels C and D report
results from the Blundell and Bond targets using the MDR and BDR, respectively. The 1st and 2nd columns present the
results for firm years with overvalued and undervalued equity, respectively. The 3rd column presents the t-statistic (p-
value) for the difference between the coefficients in the first 2 columns. The value-to-price (VP) ratio is computed using
the perfect foresight residual income model. The t-statistics (in parentheses) for the adjustment speeds are corrected for
heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. Regressions include unreported year dummy variables and firm fixed effects,
and ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Low Cash Flow High Cash Flow
(lower quartile) (upper quartile)
Difference Difference
Overvalued Undervalued t-Stat Overvalued Undervalued t-Stat
(VP< median VP) (VP > median VP) (p-value) (VP< median VP) (VP > median VP) (p-value)
Panel A. MDRs Using Fama and French Targets
Overlevered 0.7338*** 0.5427*** 2.50** 0.4755*** 0.2858*** 2.42**
(DISTANCE< 0) (13.20) (10.48) (0.012) (6.94) (6.61) (0.015)
Underlevered 0.2877*** 0.5106*** −3.24*** 0.2084*** 0.5096*** −5.18***
(DISTANCE> 0) (7.60) (8.70) (0.001) (5.21) (12.70) (<0.001)
Panel B. BDRs Using Fama and French Targets
Overlevered 0.6373*** 0.5072*** 1.79* 0.4092*** 0.2276*** 3.17***
(DISTANCE< 0) (13.62) (9.11) (0.073) (9.66) (5.95) (0.001)
Underlevered 0.4139*** 0.5237*** −1.83* 0.3942*** 0.5156*** −2.05**
(DISTANCE> 0) (11.02) (11.65) (0.068) (9.49) (12.37) (0.040)
Panel C. MDRs Using Blundell and Bond Targets
Overlevered 0.4602*** 0.3720*** 1.25 0.3683*** 0.3513*** 0.35
(DISTANCE< 0) (7.65) (9.06) (0.210) (9.20) (11.70) (0.730)
Underlevered 0.2011*** 0.4021*** −4.43 0.0802** 0.2417*** −2.79***
(DISTANCE> 0) (8.63) (9.56) (<0.001) (2.18) (5.43) (0.005)
Panel D. BDRs Using Blundell and Bond Targets
Overlevered 0.5730*** 0.3899*** 1.94* 0.3376*** 0.2684*** 1.69*
(DISTANCE< 0) (7.97) (6.61) (0.052) (11.71) (9.26) (0.092)
Underlevered 0.2916*** 0.4066*** −2.72*** 0.3954*** 0.3283*** 0.87
(DISTANCE> 0) (12.04) (11.41) (0.007) (7.41) (5.86) (0.386)
16Faulkender et al. (2009) use 15% and 85% cutoffs for their cash flow variables; however, we find
that such cutoffs significantly reduce our sample size. As we are already cutting the sample by TL and
valuation, further cuts result in relatively fewer firms in each quadrant.
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respectively. Within each panel we present the quadrant regressions for the low
cash flow firms (i.e., lower quartile) on the left-hand side of the table, and the
quadrant regressions for the high cash flow firms (i.e., upper quartile) on the right-
hand side of the table.
Before we examine the effects of cash flow on a firm’s speed of adjustment
when conditions are best suited for equity issuance, we check whether the data
continue to support our basic hypothesis. The results show that the expected dif-
ferential in adjustment speeds based on leverage and valuation are still present
after bifurcating the data by cash flow. For example, in Panel A of Table 9, within
the low cash flow group, overlevered and overvalued firms adjust more rapidly
than their undervalued counterparts. The difference in speeds is significant, with
a t-statistic of 2.50. Furthermore, the same pattern persists for the high cash flow
firms. For the high cash flow firms, the overlevered and overvalued firms adjust
more rapidly than overlevered and undervalued firms, with a significant difference
and a t-statistic of 2.42.
Turning now to the effects of cash flow on the speed of adjustment when the
incentives to issue equity are aligned (i.e., overlevered, overvalued firms that have
low cash flow), the speed of adjustment is 0.7338, implying that these firms adjust
back to their TL in less than 1.4 years. On the other hand, the similarly valued and
levered high cash flow firms adjust at a slower rate of 0.4755 and require 2.1 years
(this difference is significant at the 1% level). The corollary does not hold for the
firms that ought to be repurchasers, (underlevered and undervalued firms with
high cash flows), as the difference in adjustment speeds between low (0.5106)
and high (0.5096) cash flow firms is insignificant.
Panels B, C, and D of Table 9 repeat this analysis using the BDR (Fama and
French (2002) targets), and the Blundell and Bond (1998) targets (both MDRs
and BDRs), respectively, with qualitatively similar results. Overall these results
corroborate our primary findings and confirm that the market timing effect is in-
dependent of the cash flow effect. Furthermore, for equity issuers, the cash flow
position of the firm increases the valuation effect on the rate of adjustment in a
predictable manner.
G. Growth Opportunities and Mispricing
Book-to-market ratio can be decomposed into book-to-value and value-to-
market (the latter we refer to as VP). Theoretically, this decomposition should
completely separate growth options from equity mispricing. However, the empir-
ical implementation may induce some systemic error. Therefore, to ensure that it
is indeed mispricing and not growth opportunities that are driving the results, we
control for book-to-market ratios by dividing the sample into high (top quartile)
and low (bottom quartile) book-to-market subsamples. We then reestimate the ad-
justment speed regressions on these subsamples and report the results in Table 10
(the table is formatted similar to Table 9 except the first 3 columns correspond
to low book-to-market and the last 3 columns correspond to high book-to-market
quartiles).
If VP were just measuring growth options, then there should be no signif-
icant difference between the low VP (i.e., overvalued) firms and the high VP
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TABLE 10
Test of the Difference between Adjustment Speeds for Low and High Book-to-Market Firms
Table 10 presents the speed of adjustment estimates (λ) obtained from separate regressions of the following equation for
subsamples of firm years based on whether the firm is over- or underlevered and over- or undervalued and whether the
firm has high or low book-to-market:
(1) DRt+1 − DRt = λ [TLt+1 − DRt] + et+1,
where DRt+1 is the debt-to-assets ratio in period t + 1 and TLt+1 is the target debt ratio in period t + 1 obtained using
the Fama and French (2002) and Blundell and Bond (1998) approaches for estimating the target book debt ratio (BDR)
and target market debt ratio (MDR). Please see Section III.C for details. The distance [TLt+1 − DRt] is the total amount
that the debt ratio must change to bring the firm back to its target debt ratio. The overall sample size is 46,666. Panels
A and B report results from the Fama and French targets using the MDR and BDR, respectively. Panels C and D report
results from the Blundell and Bond targets using the MDR and BDR, respectively. The 1st and 2nd columns present the
results for firm years with overvalued and undervalued equity, respectively. The 3rd column presents the t-statistic (p-
value) for the difference between the coefficients in the first 2 columns. The value-to-price (VP) ratio is computed using
the perfect foresight residual income model. The t-statistics (in parentheses) for the adjustment speeds are corrected for
heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. Regressions include unreported year dummy variables and firm fixed effects,
and ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Low Book-to-Market High Book-to-Market
(lower quartile) (upper quartile)
Difference Difference
Overvalued Undervalued t-Stat Overvalued Undervalued t-Stat
(VP< median VP) (VP > median VP) (p-value) (VP< median VP) (VP > median VP) (p-value)
Panel A. MDRs Using Fama and French Targets
Overlevered 0.5073*** 0.4075*** 1.18 0.5491*** 0.3490*** 4.88***
(DISTANCE< 0) (11.98) (7.86) (0.236) (12.25) (20.24) (<0.001)
Underlevered 0.2103*** 0.3884*** −4.31*** 0.4346*** 0.4057*** 0.52
(DISTANCE> 0) (11.03) (10.88) (<0.001) (7.18) (16.57) (0.603)
Panel B. BDRs Using Fama and French Targets
Overlevered 0.4875*** 0.3245*** 3.44*** 0.4476*** 0.3091*** 3.44***
(DISTANCE< 0) (21.67) (7.52) (<0.001) (11.13) (16.71) (<0.001)
Underlevered 0.3788*** 0.4822*** −2.16** 0.4201*** 0.4058*** 0.34
(DISTANCE> 0) (18.09) (10.47) (0.031) (9.09) (21.61) (0.732)
Panel C. MDRs Using Blundell and Bond Targets
Overlevered 0.2755*** 0.2544*** 0.49 0.4224*** 0.3076*** 3.77***
(DISTANCE< 0) (12.74) (6.72) (0.624) (12.82) (23.72) (<0.001)
Underlevered 0.1476*** 0.2239*** −2.33** 0.3080*** 0.2946*** 0.26
(DISTANCE> 0) (10.14) (7.89) (0.02) (5.13) (13.42) (0.800)
Panel D. BDRs using Blundell and Bond Targets
Overlevered 0.3721*** 0.2716*** 2.50** 0.3618*** 0.2895*** 2.09**
(DISTANCE< 0) (19.57) (7.32) (0.012) (9.08) (19.82) (0.037)
Underlevered 0.2991*** 0.4147*** −2.74*** 0.3281*** 0.3212*** 0.13
(DISTANCE> 0) (16.08) (10.63) (0.006) (5.56) (14.99) (0.894)
(i.e., undervalued) firms. In Panel A of Table 10, for low book-to-market, over-
levered firms, the overvalued firms adjust significantly faster than the undervalued
firms. However, this difference is not significant. For the underlevered group, the
undervalued firms adjust faster than the overvalued firms (t-statistic=−4.31).
For the high book-to-market, overlevered firms, those that are overvalued
firms adjust more rapidly than undervalued firms. However, for underlevered
firms, the difference between over- and undervalued firms disappears. Panels B,
C, and D of Table 10 have qualitatively similar results. In sum, the results are
broadly robust to controlling for book-to-market. Not surprisingly, in some cases
the magnitudes of the differences in adjustment speeds are reduced, as our VP
measure is a component of book-to-market (i.e., book-to-price) and the two are
positively correlated.
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H. Zero-Debt Firms
In Table 11 we repeat our primary analysis and include firms with no long-
term debt. In the preceding tests these firms were excluded on the premise that
firms with no long-term debt may not pursue a TL policy and are therefore likely
to remain zero-debt firms regardless of the economic incentives to do otherwise.17
Including the zero-debt firms will predominantly affect the underlevered portion
of the sample, as they typically will be below their optimal target. However,
TABLE 11
Speed of Adjustment Regressions Including Zero-Debt Firms
Table 11 presents the speed of adjustment estimates (λ) obtained from separate regressions of the following equation for
subsamples of firm years based on whether the firm is over- or underlevered and over- or undervalued:
(1) DRt+1 − DRt = λ [TLt+1 − DRt] + et+1,
where DRt +1 is the debt-to-assets ratio in period t + 1 and TLt+1 is the target debt ratio in period t + 1 obtained using
the Fama and French (2002) and Blundell and Bond (1998) approaches for estimating the target book debt ratio (BDR)
and target market debt ratio (MDR). Please see Section III.C for details. The distance [TLt+1 − DRt] is the total amount
that the debt ratio must change to bring the firm back to its target debt ratio. The adjustment speed reported is the coefficient
estimate on the DISTANCE in equation (1). This table includes the 8,112 firms that previously were deleted because they
had zero-debt levels. Panels A and B report results from the Fama and French targets using the MDR and BDR, respectively.
Panels C and D report results from the Blundell and Bond targets using the MDR and BDR, respectively. The 1st and 2nd
columns present the results for firm years with overvalued and undervalued equity, respectively. The 3rd column presents
the t-statistic (p-value) for the difference between the coefficients in the first 2 columns. Zero-debt firms are included in the
sample for both the estimation of the TL and the speed of adjustments. The value-to-price (VP) ratio is computed using
the perfect foresight residual income model. The t-statistics (in parentheses) for the adjustment speeds are corrected for
heteroskedasticity and firm-level clustering. Regressions include unreported year dummy variables and firm fixed effects,
and ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Overvalued Undervalued Difference
(VP< median VP) (VP > median VP) t-Stat (p-value)
Panel A. MDRs Using Fama and French Targets
Overlevered (DISTANCE < 0) 0.5068*** 0.3607*** 5.52***
(20.95) (24.95) (<0.001)
Underlevered (DISTANCE > 0) 0.1959*** 0.3819*** −7.93***
(12.34) (22.51) (<0.001)
Panel B. BDRs Using Fama and French Targets
Overlevered (DISTANCE < 0) 0.4489*** 0.3163*** 5.60***
(25.40) (19.92) (<0.001)
Underlevered (DISTANCE > 0) 0.2175*** 0.3907*** −8.08***
(14.58) (25.39) (<0.001)
Panel C. MDRs Using Blundell and Bond Targets
Overlevered (DISTANCE < 0) 0.3128*** 0.3008*** 0.62
(18.93) (27.03) (0.533)
Underlevered (DISTANCE > 0) 0.1170*** 0.2410*** −6.37***
(9.61) (15.71) (<0.001)
Panel D. BDRs Using Blundell and Bond Targets
Overlevered (DISTANCE < 0) 0.3549*** 0.2713*** 4.43***
(24.49) (22.08) (<0.001)
Underlevered (DISTANCE > 0) 0.2418*** 0.3057*** −3.04***
(16.62) (20.36) (<0.001)
17Byoun et al. (2008) note that debt-free firms seem to behave in a manner that “is contrary to value
maximization.” Further, many of these firms remain debt free for extended periods. Since we constrain
the predicted target to be between 0 and 1, all debt-free firms will be classified as underlevered. If the
valuation measure is distributed similarly across these firms as in the levered firms, the zero-debt firms
will reduce the rate of adjustment for both over- and undervalued firms, and the primary impact will
be an increase in the standard error.
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depending upon the estimation approach (as discussed in Section III.C), some
targets are less than 0, and this would cause a small fraction of the zero-debt firms
to be classified as overlevered. Additionally, since the target estimates use the full
sample, inclusion of the zero-debt firms may have an impact on the overlevered
sample. The inclusion of the zero long-term debt firms adds 8,112 observations to
the analysis.
The results in Table 11 confirm our expectations. The overall speed of ad-
justment for the underlevered firms is lower than in the primary analysis. Given
that many zero-debt firms rarely if ever add debt to their balance sheet, this is not
surprising (i.e., many of these firms will have a zero-adjustment rate). However,
despite the inclusion of zero-debt firms, for both underlevered and overlevered
firms, the primary valuation result continues to hold, in some cases more strongly
than in the earlier analysis.
V. Conclusion
We hypothesize that equity mispricing will impact the firm’s rate of adjust-
ment toward a TL. We expect to find that firms that are above their TL (i.e., firms
that need to issue equity and/or repurchase debt) and whose equity is overpriced
will adjust more rapidly toward their target than firms with underpriced equity.
They will do so by issuing overvalued equity. Correspondingly, firms that are be-
low their TL (i.e., firms that need to issue debt and/or repurchase equity) and
whose equity is overpriced will adjust more slowly toward their target than firms
with underpriced equity. In this case, the firms with underpriced equity will more
aggressively repurchase shares.
The results of our empirical tests support our hypothesis. Under- versus over-
valued firms adjust their leverage at significantly different rates. For example, in
Panel A of Table 5, using the Fama and French (2002) targets and market lever-
age, overvalued firms adjust to their target in about 1.9 years, while undervalued
firms take about 3 years. Our results are robust to different methods of measuring
equity mispricing and modeling TL, alternative definitions of leverage, alternative
time periods, including zero-debt firms, and adding controls for growth options
and cash flow status.
The effect of equity mispricing on adjustment speeds becomes even more im-
portant when the firm’s cash flow position is considered. In particular, firms with
overvalued equity that need to raise capital and are also overlevered adjust more
rapidly to their target than those firms that do not have cash flow shortfalls. Our
findings are consistent with equity mispricing being an important capital structure
adjustment cost.
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